

A FORGOTTEN PATH OF POLITICAL CATHOLICISM? NATIONAL-CATHOLICISM IN POLAND AND IN SPAIN 1939-1945¹

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SUMMARY: The aim of the article is to identify parallels between national Catholicism in Poland and in Spain in the period between 1939 and 1945. In Poland under the Nazi occupation, Catholics engaged in the clandestine politics. The most significant group was 'Unia' which in 1942 elaborated a coherent national-catholic doctrine that, contrary to the nationalistic mainstream in Poland, put its Catholicism and messianism in the centre of political thinking. Between 1943 and 1945 'Unia' underwent a deep transformation, following the decision to join Christian-democratic *Stronnictwo Pracy*. In Spain the period 1939-1945 is the time of the regime building. Firstly it seemed that Spain would become a fascist state, however, the increasing influence of monarchist and conservative circles led to solidification of a catholic-national doctrine. It is argued that the catholic-national synthesis presented by 'Unia' in 1942 and in Spain throughout the years 1938-1945 (as a counterproposal for the fascist option) constitute an important but forgotten moment in the intellectual history of European political Catholicism.

KEY WORDS: National Catholicism – Franco – Poland – Nazi occupation – political ideologies

¿UN CAMINO OLVIDADO DEL CATOLICISMO POLÍTICO? NACIONALCATOLICISMO EN POLONIA Y ESPAÑA EN 1939-1945

RESUMEN: El objetivo del artículo es identificar paralelismos entre el nacionalcatolicismo en Polonia y en España en el período entre 1939 y 1945. En Polonia bajo la ocupación nazi, los católicos se involucraron en la política clandestina. El grupo

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más significativo fue ,Unia' que en 1942 elaboró una doctrina nacionalcatólica coherente que, contrariamente a la corriente principal nacionalista en Polonia, puso su catolicismo y mesianismo en el centro del pensamiento político. Entre 1943 y 1945, ,Unia' experimentó una profunda transformación, tras la decisión de unirse a un partido democristiano Stronnictwo Pracy. En España el período 1939-1945 fue el momento de la construcción del régimen. En primer lugar, parecía que España se convertiría en un estado fascista, sin embargo, la influencia de los círculos monárquicos y conservadores condujo a la solidificación de una doctrina católico-nacional. Se argumenta que la síntesis católico-nacional presentada por la ,Unia' en 1942 y en España a lo largo de los años 1938-1945 (como contrapropuesta a la opción fascista) constituye un momento importante pero olvidado en la historia intelectual del catolicismo político europeo.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Nacional catolicismo – Franco – Polonia – ocupación nazista – ideologías políticas

INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of the World War II on 1 September 1939 changed everything for Poland and little for Spain. The former suffered a two-folded blow firstly being attacked by Nazi Germany (and its Slovak allies), and then, on 17 September by the USSR. The latter, had just experience an end of a three-years-long civil war and was entering a 40 years period of authoritarian regime. It may seem that both countries had little in common. However, the Spanish Civil War had been watched in Poland with significant interest. Polish Catholics in an overwhelming majority sided with the Nationalists' side².

After the fall of the Polish state in September 1939, there was a vast mobilization of all political forces which by the 1940 had formed rich and dense network of clandestine organizations opposing German occupation. Soon political parties formed structures of the Polish Underground State establishing links with the government in exile in London. However, much of ideological work and planning for the future took place outside of state structures which focused on the immediate fight against the occupant. One of these organizations was 'Union', active between 1941 and 1945 with an aim to reform political Catholicism in Poland and provide a catholic-national blueprint for the reconstruction.

In this paper I want to highlight the ideological parallels between the project proposed by 'Unia' and the Francoist vision of Spain. The compared formations vehemently opposed liberal democracy, seeing it, to use Emmanuel

² Wojciech OPIOŁA, "Stanowisko polskiej prasy katolickiej wobec wojny domowej w Hiszpanii 1936-1939. Analiza dyskursu medialnego", *Media-Kultura-Społeczeństwo*, 5 (2010), p. 5-19.

Mounier's phrase, as an established disorder³. At the same time, many of them were no traditionalists. While some of the Francoist intellectual elites employed the language of the restoration of the monarchy and return to the past "golden age" (a trait similar to their Polish counterparts who sought to recreate early modern Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth), the institutional framework they proposed was *par excellence* modern. It was an effort to combine exigences of religion and modernity, in a way that would protect and promote "one true religion" and ensure governability of such regime. To a certain extent, the proposals presented below envisaged a modern Christian *autocracy* in opposition to dominant in the interwar and war period liberal-democratic and totalitarian, be it fascist, Nazi or communist regimes.

James Chappel proposed a term *paternal Catholic modernism* to describe this phenomenon. According to the American scholar paternal Catholic modernism focused on the following problems: family (however, perceiving it mainly as the question of increasing nativity rates and provide welfare); labour (raising the issue of corporative representation and management); nationalism (especially for its anti-communism and anti-liberal function)⁴. In this article I hope to extend this list by proposing to include *messianism* as one of the funding elements of the intellectual position described by Chappel.

The argument will follow a five-fold structure: firstly, I describe the establishment of the Union –a Polish clandestine network of partisan and intellectual groups in General Governorship⁵ in occupied Poland which by 1941 had established itself as an independent and powerful structure able to take part in the works of the clandestine state institutions and influence the political and intellectual life of the Polish resistance. Secondly, I turn to the Union's ideology and the draft of the constitution which was written between 1941 and 1942. Thirdly I briefly describe the process of regime building in post-civil-war Spain. Fourthly, I look into the key legal acts and ideological concepts that were employed by the Spanish lawmakers in their construction of the new state. Finally, the comparison with the Spanish case will allow me to identify the Union's ideology as a Catholic missionary nationalism.

³ Wiliam RAUCH Jr, *Politics and Belief in contemporary France. Emmanuel Mounier and Christian Democracy 1932-1950*, Hague, 1972, p. 83.

⁴ James CHAPPEL, *Catholic Modern. The Challenge of Totalitarianism and the Remaking of the Church*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2018, p. 59-107.

⁵ After German and Soviet invasions of Poland in September 1939 the territory of the Second Polish Republic was divided into three parts: western parts (Silesia, Greater Poland, Pomerania) were directly incorporated into III Reich, the eastern regions were incorporated into USSR as Soviet western Belarussian and Ukrainian republics. The remaining central part of the country, long the Vistula river remained under German occupation headed by General Governor.

‘UNIA’ –CONSOLIDATION OF POLISH POLITICAL CATHOLICISM DURING SECOND WORLD WAR (1940-1942)

It is impossible to grasp the uniqueness of the Union's position without taking into account brief and troubled history of political rivalry in the interwar Poland. After the early modern Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth became divided among three neighbouring states: Prussian, Russian and Austrian empires, those who identified as Poles struggled to gain political recognition and representation. By the end of the XIX two tendencies of defining Polish political nation had emerged. The first one, represented by Roman Dmowski focused on ethnic, linguistic and cultural identification: a Pole had to identify as such, speak Polish and be Catholic. The process of national awakening had to reach the very bottom parts of the society instilling them with a sense of national identity and political awareness. This limited the possible territorial range of future Polish state, but ensured greater social cohesiveness needed if one wanted to establish a democracy in line with the French and British models. An alternative vision of Polish statehood was represented by Józef Piłsudski, who combined the socialist revolutionary zeal and inclusiveness with the legacy of multi-confessional and multi-ethnic Polish-Lithuanian state⁶.

The second Polish republic established in 1918 realized neither of those visions. The country was dominated by ethnic Poles, yet it there were significant Jewish, Ukrainian and German minorities. Considering social reforms, since the beginning progressive reforms of 8 hours workday and universal suffrage for women did not change conservative and religiously inspired views of the majority of voters, which made National Democrats –Dmowski's party the leading political force in Poland.

The 1921 constitution implemented a French-inspired model of parliamentary democracy. Inclusive electoral law and numerous ethnic and religious cleavages made the Sejm (the parliament) unable to ensure stable majority. The governments lasted couple of months before falling due to political intrigue. Suffice to say that between 1922 and 1926 there were eleven governments. This convinced Piłsudski of the insurmountable weaknesses of the parliamentary democracy which led to the coup on 12 May 1926. Piłsudski's movement took the name *Sanacja* (recuperation) and proclaimed the sanitisation of public life by expelling vice and corruption. The opposition forces were allowed to operate legally, however, due to administrative constrains, censorship and in times violent repression by the government, they were unable to seize the power.

⁶ See. Brian PORTER-SZUCS, *Poland in the Modern World. Beyond Martyrdom*, Chichester 2014, p. 65-105.

In the interwar Poland two political forces enjoyed catholic both in terms of popular preference as well as by the support shown by the Catholic Hierarchy. These were National Democrats, and Christian democrats who did not shun from nationalist rhetoric, but who derived their political agenda from the Church's social teaching. National democrats in 1928 rebranded as the National Party (*Stronnictwo Narodowe*, SN) were one of the most important political forces in the interwar Poland. Although after Piłsudski's coup they were unable to overthrow the authoritarian regime, SN remained popular among Catholic voters. Interestingly, the strong ties between the nationalist ideology and Catholicism, taken for granted in the 1930s, were a relatively recent ideological innovation introduced by the unquestioned leader of the nationalist movement, Roman Dmowski, just a decade earlier. The shift in the political ideology coincided with Dmowski's personal conversion and with his distancing himself from the SN's old guard and siding with the younger generations – deeply Catholic and openly antidemocratic. The leader of the young nationalists, Bolesław Piasecki proposed a new ideology of the movement which combined Catholicism with the idea of dictatorial, ethnic Polish state⁷. According to the manifesto published in the free supplement to the first issue of the magazine of Piasecki's movement *Falanga* (the Falange), young radical nationalists combined in their ideology the rhetoric of nationalism, Christianity, antisemitism and syndicalism⁸.

The second, and considerably less influential political party that enjoyed Catholic support were Christian Democrats. With industrial Silesia as they stronghold, home of the charismatic leader, Wojciech Korfanty⁹. For them the coup in 1926 caused a break in their ranks – a minority joined Piłsudski, others including Korfanty, chose opposition. Korfanty was one of the victims of the political trials of 1930 and spent some time as political prisoner in the infamous confinement camp in Bereza Kartuska. The opposition to Sanacja government was a factor that brought together various centrist forces: the so-called Front Morges coalition in 1937 was a failed attempt to bring together some of the political forces hostile to Sanacja regime (agrarians, Christian democrats, centrist combatant organizations). The invitation was not extended to the leading anti-Sanacja forces: National Democrats and socialists (PPS). When the agrarians dropped out, instead of a broad coalition of heterogeneous political forces, two remaining parties of Christian inspiration: Christian Demo-

7 Mikołaj KUNICKI, *Between the Brown and the Red. Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in Twentieth-Century Poland-The Politics of Boleslaw Piasecki*, Athens OH 2013.

8 "Falanga" dodatek bezpłatny, 12 June 1936.

9 Piotr H. KOSICKI, "Masters in their own home or defenders of the human person? Wojciech korfanty, anti-semitism, and polish Christian democracy's illiberal rights-talk", *Modern Intellectual History*, 14 (1/2017), p. 99-113.

crats and National People's Party (small, radical worker's party which rejected Marxism) merged and rebranded themselves as the Labour Party (*Stronnictwo Pracy*, SP). While relatively weak organization-wise, SP was very well connected internationally enjoying the support of Ignacy Jan Paderewski, pianist and former prime minister as well as of general Władysław Sikorski –influential military leader pushed aside by Piłsudski. These networks made SP an indispensable part of the Polish government in exile during the war.

After the defeat in Autumn 1939 Polish society under occupation quickly began to organize itself both militarily –first structures were established already by the end of September 1939 and by the mid 1940 already 60 000 people were involved in the clandestine armed forces which recognized the leadership of the government in exile in London. Politically, four major parties (national democrats, socialists, agrarians and Christian democrats) established their underground structures and begun to form a substitute of a parliament and temporary clandestine administration.

The emergence of the Union was a part of mobilization of the whole society to resist the occupant. What made this organization unique was the fact that it gathered people across the political and ideological divides of pre-1939 Poland becoming a melting pot of political Catholicism in Poland. The Union was created between 1940 and 1941 as a loose federation of organizations that had emerged spontaneously since 1939. All these groups had strong intellectual profile and aimed at providing Polish society with ideological and morale resources for the time of occupation. One of the first historians of Union indicated the following groups: *Warszawianka* (the Warsawer), *Nowa Polska* (New Poland), *Grunwald*, and seniors of the Catholic student associations *Odrodzenie* (Rebirth)¹⁰. At the same time Jerzy Braun, who was *spiritus movens* of the newly established organization kept close relations with members of nationalist, radical groups such as ONR and ONR Falanga, though these groups did not join the Union¹¹.

Warszawianka was an organization of employees of Warsaw magistrate, closely linked with Sanacja's commissioner Stefan Starzyński murdered by Gestapo in December 1939. Another group that came to Union from the Sanacja circles was *Jutro Pracy* (Tomorrow of Labour), whose leader Jan Hoppe recalled disappointment of the late Sanacja regime and the suppression of the societal activism. In 'Unia' Hoppe saw a group equally committed to appreciate the societal dimension of political and economic life, he wrote: "In the triangle of regime, which failed to mobilize the society failed its historic task to reform

10 Konstanty TUROWSKI, *Historia ruchu chrześcijańsko-demokratycznego w Polsce*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1989, p. 441.

11 Marek HAŃDEREK, *Unia 1940-1948: dzieje zapomnianego ruchu ideowego*, Warszawa 2019, p. 186-199.

the society battles the main one was between the nineteenth century liberalism and twentieth century state. The third factor: organized society did not play its part”¹².

New Poland was a regional group active in south-east Poland. The author of its name, Jerzy Braun, was a renowned but eccentric writer and intellectual. Throughout the inter-war period he strived to popularize the works of Józef Hoene-Wroński romantic philosopher whose messianic ideas inspired Adam Mickiewicz, the greatest Polish poet of the first half of the XIX century. Before 1939 he was known as the editor of literary journals “Gazeta Literacka” and “Zet”. After the outbreak of the Second World War Braun re-established his contacts among writers and intellectuals. He had friends in the circles of the archbishop of Cracow Adam Sapieha which allowed Braun to meet and influence cultural elites of the old Polish capital, including young seminarian, Karol Wojtyła.

Another group that eventually joined the Union was an organization called *Grunwald* (named after a battle in 1410 in which Polish and Lithuanian knights won against Teutonic Order). The core of the organization were former employees of National Development Bank (BGK)¹³. One of the leaders of Grunwald was Konrad Sieniewicz¹⁴ who together with Stefan Kisielewski¹⁵ edited a clandestine magazine “Warta”. Contact between New Poland and Grunwald between December 1939 and spring 1940 were the first step towards the establishment of the Union¹⁶.

Afterwards the Union was joined by two crucial, from the ideological standpoint, organizations. First was the Confederation of Polish Organizations for Independence (KNOP) led by Stanisław Bukowski. By the time of the merger with the Union, KNOP had developed a set of constitutional ideas regarding post-war Poland, one of which was the creation of the position of a *regent* who would be elected for a lifetime and would exercise some of key “royal” prerogatives irrespectively of the head of government. Second interesting ideological feature of the KNOP was an articulated organicist vision of multi-ethnic society ordered in “confederations” according to ethnicity and profession. Third aspect was the deeply Catholic foundation of the political ideology, which drew from 1656 Jasna Góra vows to Virgin Mary of king Jan

12 Jan HOPPE, *Wspomnienia, przyczynki, refleksje*, Londyn 1972, p. 115.

13 Konstanty TUROWSKI, *Historia ruchu...*, p. 442.

14 Sieniewicz after the war became the secretary general of the Christian-democratic Labour Party (SP) and personal aid of Karol Popiel, who since 1939 until his death in 1977 was the president of the party (after 1947, the party operated in exile, mainly in Rome, United States and Paris).

15 A young music critic, who after 1945 became one of the most original political columnists writing for the Catholic *Tygodnik Powszechny*.

16 Marek HAŃDEREK, *Unia 1940-1948...*, *op. cit.*, p. 36-40.

Kazimierz Waza¹⁷. Second was the Frond of the Poland's Rebirth (FOP) with the leading figures such as Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, a successful Catholic writer and a renown public figure of the interwar Poland, and Witold Bieńkowski, a journalist between 1931 and 1939 writing for Christian-democrat leaning "Głos Narodu". The ability to attract people from conservative milieus gave the Union credibility on the right, which should not be taken for granted given the presence of people of Sanacja-background.

Another important Braun's acquisition in 1941 was gaining trust and collaboration of senior figures of student Catholic association Rebirth (SKMA *Odrodzenie*). In terms of numbers, Rebirth was not the most influential student organization, however, it was strong in the Catholic University of Lublin, and visible in the main academic centres of Poland: Vilnius, Warsaw, Cracow, and Lviv. Rebirth enjoyed support from Catholic hierarchy and played important role in encouraging studies in Catholic social teaching as well as in popularizing the thought of Jacques Maritain in Poland¹⁸. Some of the pre-war leaders and important figures of the Rebirth (Ludwik Górski, Michał Sobański, Czesław Strzeszewski, Jerzy Turowicz) were recruited by Braun either as main ideologues or as collaborators and contributors to clandestine press. Their main task was to prepare foundations and concepts for the restoration of the Catholic cultural life in after the end of the war¹⁹.

To sum up, the Union as emerged in 1941 was a broad coalition of heterogeneous groups of intellectual, rather than military, profile. It gathered people previously active in the public domain, however without a party affiliation. The common ground for the Union was Catholicism and the sense that the pre-war Sanacja state failed. The ambition of the Union leaders was not political – they entered into cooperation with clandestine parties, especially the agrarians, Christian democrats and nationalists²⁰. No earlier than in 1942 did the Union start to strengthen ties with political parties, initially trying to balance between the SL (agrarians) and SP (Christian democrats), but ultimately, the Union decided to enter a strategic cooperation with the latter group; Union leaders became members of the SP presidium and most of the rank and file of the organization took SP legitimations²¹. However, the Union, at least partially kept its autonomy until it ceased its operations in Poland in 1946²².

17 *Ibidem*, p. p. 51-53, 88

18 Piotr H. KOSICKI, *Catholic on the Barricades. Poland, France and „Revolution” 1891-1956*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018, p. 36-41.

19 Jacek ŻAKOWSKI, *Trzy ćwiartki wieku. Rozmowy z Jerzym Turowiczem*, Kraków 1990, p. 33-34.

20 Marek HAŃDEREK, *Unia...*, *op. cit.*, p. 186-200.

21 *Ibidem*, p. 200; Konrad SIENIEWICZ, „Jan – pragmatyk” in Jerzy BRAUN, Karol POPIEL, Konrad SIENIEWICZ, *Człowiek ze spizu*, Wrocław, 1987, p. 78.

22 Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance [AIPN], Protokół z posiedzenia komitetu wykonawczego Unii wraz z zaproszonymi członkami Zarządu Głównego w Krakowie odbytego 13 I 1946 r., AIPN BU 1607/85, f. 22r.

Although the organization maintained some military capacities, after the fall of France in 1940, the Union decided to focus its efforts on the ideological front, trying to keep the Polish morale high despite prospects of a long occupation by engaging in the “civic education”²³. The command over the troops had been handed to the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*) which allowed Jerzy Braun, Kazmierz Studentowicz and other intellectuals to work on the ideological foundations of the movement and their dissemination²⁴.

CHRISTIAN MESSIANIC NATIONALISM: STATE AND NATION ACCORDING TO THE ‘UNIA’

The main pillars of the Union’s ideology before the merger with the SP were formulated between 1940 and 1941. Heavily burdened with the fall of the Polish state the Union was convinced that the ongoing war was a symptom of moral decay of the modern world, symbolized by the rise of materialistic ideologies and that the future order should be based on the return to Christianity. “The war is a symptom of a general crisis of the civilisation, whose development was pushed on a side track. A wrong conception of anthropocentrism broke the connection between the man and God, leading to the cult of the *Übermensch* in the German revolution”²⁵ wrote Jerzy Braun laying the foundations of the Union’s ideology and sketching a dualistic vision of the Second World War where “violence and the moral law fight against each other for the Europe’s soul”. Interestingly, to the side of violence Braun counted modern capitalism, Marxist idea of class struggle as well as “non-thought-through nationalism” and the doctrine of the state’s omnipotence “developed by totalism”²⁶.

The rejection of capitalism and its XX century opponents Communism and Nazism was complemented by a close examination of Catholic Europe, which Braun found weak, terrified and incapable of proposing a framework for material and spiritual reconstruction of Europe:

“Catholic nations fall on after another into Hitler’s grasp, who is a symbolic representation of the theory of violence and neo-pagan doctrine. Catholic Italy has allied with him for life and death, Catholic Spain sympathises with him, rather than with his enemies, Catholic Hungary invaded Yugoslavia, Catholic Croatia betrayed for Hitler’s benefit.

23 Konrad SIENIEWICZ, „Jan – pragmatyk...”, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

24 Jan HOPPE, *Wspomnienia, przyczynki, refleksje*, Londyn: Unia, p. 328.

25 Central Archive for Modern Records [AAN], Unia, 344/1, Jerzy BRAUN, *Światopoglądowe podstawy Unionizmu*, f. 17.

26 *Ibidem*, f. 17a.

Without taking into account Belgium, undecided Portugal, only Poland saves Christianity's face thanks for its relentless resistance"²⁷.

In light of the European-wide failure of the Catholic states to resist Hitler's power and ideology, Braun sets Union a task of formulation a "catholic realisation paradigm" – a set of principles and means to modernize the state without violating tenants of the Catholic faith and worldview. What is particularly interesting, Braun saw his model as and it this way contribute to the moral, social and international stability once Hitler was defeated: "(...) the final outcome: the military fall of Germany, but also the exhaustion of democratic powers. This is how is prepared (...) the birth and triumph of a new and victorious idea, which goes beyond democracy and totalism, two doctrines and regime types of materialistic era (...) and whose point of origin can only be Poland"²⁸.

What type of regime would allow Poland to play such important role envisaged by Braun? An interesting and valuable source of information is provided by an unfinished project of constitution drafted probably in the late 1941²⁹. It provides a good reading of how Union's intellectuals attempted to enhance liberal-democratic model and how they envisaged the role of the state in shaping economic and cultural life.

The project opens with a declaration that the "Polish state is the political organization of the Polish Nation" whose goal is to ensure the development of individuals and groups according to Christian principles (art 1). As a consequence, the constitution did not recognized the universal political equality, but discerned two groups: citizens and inhabitants (art. 2, 12). Citizens were inhabitants of Polish ethnicity or belonging to groups with deep historical ties with Poland. As for inhabitants the constitution enumerated three categories: Germans, Jews, foreigners (art. 14). Citizenship could be acquired by birth from at least one parent of Polish descent (art. 22), however, from people born from a Jewish mother the constitution required conversion in order to grant full citizenship. The discrimination clauses and rigid application of ethnic principle in granting rights and liberties, together with the identification between Catholicism as a privileged religion (art. 5) suggest that the Union remained under heavy influence of Nationalist ideology from the pre-1914 and interwar periods and operationalized in its legal and political thought the concept of *Polak-katolik*³⁰.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 18.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 16a.

²⁹ AAN, Unia, 344/2, Projekt ustawy zasadniczej.

³⁰ Brian PORTER-SZUCS, *Faith and Fatherland. Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 328ff.

With regard to the state as the “political organization of the nation”, Union’s constitutional theorists proposed two important modifications of the liberal-democratic balance of powers. The first one was a radical strengthening of the position of the President, which went further in comparison with the authoritarian April Constitution from 1935³¹. The President was called the “superior actor” (art. 27(a)), he nominated ministers, members of the upper chamber of parliament and the Justice Chancellor the superior of the state’s control apparatus. The second important modification was the establishment of an independent controlling body –Council of State, headed by the Justice Chancellor and formed by the heads of tribunals and legal professions’ corporations (art. 88). This body main task was to control the judiciary and select candidates which would then run for the office of President. Despite nationalistic rhetoric and critique of the liberal democracy, the Union was cautious to embrace authoritarian and totalitarian mechanisms at the level of constitutional solutions. The interesting attempt to enhance the controlling mechanisms of the state could be seen as a result of the need to balance the will of the people represented by the lower chamber of the parliament, with the “law of Truth” –a steering principle of the Union’s political ideology³².

It would be reductive, if one stopped here with the analysis of the Union’s constitutional ideas. The legal framework set in the draft of the constitution was only a part of a broader civilizational project which apart from the institutional reform consisted in proposing a new type of nationalism which combined a revival of historical myths and deep reform of the economy, subordinating it to the needs of the nation.

Nationalism was a central feature of the Union’s ideology. The ethnic dimension of the ongoing war only exacerbated the elements of political thinking that saw the essence of the social problems which had shaken the Second Polish Republic. However, the concept of nation as developed by Jerzy Braun, chief Union’s thinker in this area, was deeply embedded in Polish history and merged with the attempt to recreate a multi-ethnic Commonwealth. This, together with a religiously inspired, messianic vision of history, resulted in an original vision of nation and state combining elements of rapid modernization with historical myths of imperial grandeur.

One of the programmatic documents of the Union stated openly: “In Poland (...) should rule a national messianism, which is a new type of nationalism: missionary, universal and offensive which differs it from defensive, zoological and parochial nationalism of the old type”³³. The messianic element was

31 Antony POLONSKY, *Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939. The Crisis of Constitutional Government*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 386-389.

32 AAN, Unia, 344/2, Deklaracja ideowa Unii, p. 4.

33 AIPN BU 1607/90, *Tezy naszego ruchu*, f. 2.

by Braun considered a founding element of a modern national identity, he was convinced that nation exist only where: “a group transcends the determinants of material living, where emerges a new, higher purpose, mission, an idea”³⁴. This way of thinking culminated in the emergence of a concept of the Polish Idea according to which, other nation states should mimic Poland in its historical experience of forming a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Union with Lithuania.

The most developed version of this idea was elaborated by Kazimierz Studentowicz, who was the key figure in the Union leadership with regard to economy and foreign policy. Educated in Cracow, London and New York, Studentowicz worked for the Bank of National Economy (BGK) and collaborated in the late 1930s with young conservatives (Jerzy Giedroyć, Adolf Bocheński) who while supporting Sanacja regime, wanted deep reforms in order to empower the state in order to fight the threats posed by III Reich and Soviet Union.

In 1942 Studentowicz finished one of his most important political writings of the war period entitled *Polish Foreign Policy*³⁵. This long document defined long-term goals, set out a strategy and provide ideological explanation of an expansionist, but also integrative foreign policy Poland should pursue after the fall of Nazi Germany. In this work Studentowicz summed up modern European politics: “The tragedy of continental Europe, which prevented it from establishing United States of the Old Continent was that only Poland nurtured political ideas which could bring about this unity. Poland, having established a Commonwealth, forgot about power and further expansion, signing in this way its own death sentence”³⁶. He continued by formulating the thesis of Polish exceptionalism and special place in the European order: “Poland, in this part of the world, is (...) a synonym of a method of public life and relations among the nations, the only method capable of pushing the history of the mankind forward, and whose abandonment mean the fall (of civilization) and return to barbarism”³⁷.

The deeply held conviction of Polish *Sonderweg* inspired Studentowicz to search for a method to maximize the efficiency of the Polish state in order to allow the realisation of the mission described above. To this end Union pursued new type of social and economic order. Concerning the former, the Union was close to an organic vision of society, a dense network of groups and interactions

34 Quoted in: Rafał ŁĘTOCHA, *Oportet vos nasci denuo. Myśl społeczno-polityczna Jerzego Brauna*, Kraków: Nomos 2006, p. 283.

35 AAN, Unia, 344/1, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski*. The documents has been recently edited in: Tomasz SIKORSKI (ed.), *Polski Savonarola. Pisma polityczne Kazimierza Studentowicza z okresu wojny i okupacji*, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2013.

36 *Ibidem*, p. 434.

37 *Ibidem*, p. 451.

autonomous vis-à-vis the state: “an organized nation is not a monopoly, as it happens in totalitarian regime, but a universal, single professional organization ruled by the principle of self-government. The state should exercise only those tasks which cannot be achieved by the spontaneous initiative of groups and individuals. (...) Nation has a right to self-government (...) independent from public administration and created on a basis of free and fair elections”³⁸. This self-government should have two branches: economic and cultural, both consider equally important for the flourishing of the person.

With regard to the economy, while Studentowicz, the author of the Union’s programme in this regard, believed in a primacy of the politics over economy, he was against the total control of the state over economic decisions and processes³⁹. The state’s intervention was particularly needed in two sectors: agriculture and industry. Poland was a predominantly rural country with great inequalities among landowners with a huge number of smallholders and an influential group of possessors of huge estates. For Studentowicz the state should encourage the model of a single-family farm, which should be able to provide for own consumption and sell the excess on the market⁴⁰. As for the industrial policy, the economic thinker of the Union envisaged an active role of government in providing cheap credit for crucial branches of industry and maintain state control over strategic sectors of the economy⁴¹. The policy of investment and development was to be complemented by social policy both in terms of transfers and social services, as well as by increasing participation of the masses in economic governance through professional self-government⁴².

To conclude, the political ideology of the Union had two important aspects. The first one was typical for the Catholic thinking from the 1930s and followed papal teaching on state’s duties and limits of action regarding economic governance. The Union was receptive of some corporatist ideas, with interesting focus on culture and cultural self-government. On the other hand little was said about territorial and ethnic autonomy, which leads to the second aspect of Union’s political ideology: nationalism. The primacy of ethnic Poles within the projected state, as well as the moral primacy of Poland in the post-war international relations, were correlated choices, founded on a premise of a historic mission of the Polish people to serve as a normative power among European nations and states. The messianic element was closely linked to the geopolitical project of restoring early modern Commonwealth as a one bloc of Central European nations under Polish leadership.

38 AAN, Unia, 344/2, *Deklaracja ideowa Unii...*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

39 Tomasz SIKORSKI (ed.), *Polski Savonarola...*, *op. cit.*, p. 193, 219-220.

40 *Ibidem*, p. 237.

41 *Ibidem*, p. 243.

42 *Ibidem*, p. 251.

The program worked out by 'Unia' did not last long. Since the talks with agrarians and nationalist did not allow the organization to influence those camps, it turned to weaker Christian democrats from SP. In 1942 both organizations signed an agreement by virtue of which the leadership of 'Unia' joined SP, while the organizations remained separate. SP continued the political work, while the 'Unia' completely focused on cultural engagement. Throughout 1943 a new wave of programmatic work took place culminating in the mid-1944 with the preparation of the new programme of the SP. The outbreak of the uprising in Warsaw postponed the publication of the document, which appeared in January 1945 in Cracow⁴³.

Even a superficial reading of the document shows the democratic turn in the 'Unia' ideology. It identifies three ideological principles: Christian, democratic and national joint by a subsidiary values of rightfulness and social justice. The positioning democracy at the core of the program of SP-'Unia' movement marks a fundamental shift in the self-perception of the movement steering away from the national movement. One of its leaders, Jan Hoppe set the goal "to create a broad Christian-social movement (...) a forerunner of MRP or *Democrazia Cristiana*"⁴⁴. This means that between the draft of the authoritarian constitution around 1941 and the preparation of the programme of 1944/45, 'Union' abandoned its non-democratic, nationalistic project, proving its maturity and ability to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment, as well as indicating the impossibility of proposing a Catholic authoritarian ideology in Poland by the end of the second world war.

CONSOLIDATION(S) OF THE NATIONAL RIGHT IN SPAIN BETWEEN 1936 AND 1945

The outbreak of the civil war in Spain set in motion a long process of reconfiguration of the national right. Between 1936 and 1945 one could witness the evolution of the currents that emerged in the early XX century into families within Franco regime. This transformation had few culminating moments, the most important being the failed attempt to establish a "pure" fascist regime in Spain (1940-1942) and the attempt to restore the monarchy by the end of the second world war. Francisco Franco managed to navigate through these trials and establish a durable regime founded, from the ideological perspective, on few key tenants of Catholic-national creed.

The political scene of the Spanish *Nuevo Estado* was never a monolith. It inherited trends and divisions among Spanish right from well before the out-

⁴³ *Program Stronnictwa Pracy*, Kraków [1945], IPN BU 00231/140/1

⁴⁴ Konrad SIENIEWICZ *Jan – pragmatyk...*, *op. cit.*, p. 89-90,

break of the civil war. Nevertheless, the consolidation of the state and the decision of general Franco to establish a single movement suppressing political parties created a pressure for a political and ideological consolidation. The forced unity of organization under the authority of *caudillo* became stood behind a hybrid ideology of the regime, combining falangist, conservative and Catholic elements, and was a moment of put some of the divisions from before 1936 behind.

Two processes favoured the consolidation of the right under Franco. The first one was the fact that the divisions and radicalization in Spanish politics were in place well before 18 July 1936, one may say, they accompanied the young republic since its proclamation in 1931. Moreover, the tense atmosphere of the final months of the second republic, the inability of the moderate forces from the conservative and progressive sides to tame the radical movements on the right and left, including the readiness to use widespread political violence, contributed to the outbreak of the war⁴⁵. This showed the incapability of the established forces on the one hand, and the radical Falange on the other, to seize the power⁴⁶. The fact that the coup was carried out by the military, and that the leadership of the rebels did not favour one particular faction of the right-wing Spanish politics played important part in the emergence of a new politico-ideological equilibrium.

The second process in place in 1936 that led to a new ideological synthesis was the literal and symbolic decapitation of all political forces of the right at the very beginning of the conflict. The assassination of José Calvo Sotelo weakened monarchists. The shooting of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and Ramiro Ledesma decapitated the Falange⁴⁷. José Maria Gil Robles escaped to France and then Portugal leaving *cedistas* without charismatic leadership. In case of carlists, their leader Manuel Fal Conde attempted to create a political alternative for the military junta, but was exiled by Franco. This wide vacuum in the political leadership of the victorious insurgents created a space for other ambitious actors to reshape the Spanish right, whole the failure of the attempt to seize Madrid in 1936, as well as the resolve of the republican government to arm the population led to the transition of the rebellion into a prolonged, bloody conflict, whose character justified the primacy of the military over the political leadership.

45 Stanely G. PAYNE, *Falange. A history of Spanish fascism*, Stanford 1961, esp. p. 49-58; Pio Moa RODRIGUEZ, *El derrumbe de la segunda república y la Guerra civil*, Madrid: Encuentro, 2009, p. 278-279, 351.

46 Mary VINCENT, "Spain" in Richard J.B. BOSWROTH (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, Oxford: OUP, 2010 (online edition).

47 The third triumvir, Onesimo Redondo died in battle in June 1936.

The political power in laid since October 1936 in the *Junta de Defensa Nacional* (JDN), and personally in Franco's hands as the sole commander and *de facto* dictator. This solution, while sufficient for a coup or quick conflict, was not sustainable for a prolonged hostility and the need to organize political support. In lieu of a proper political ideology at first the military commanders resorted to a call to conservative and religious ideals and a promise of a just revolution⁴⁸, sketching an idea of traditionalist-national state and crusade⁴⁹. This was enough to formulate a program against the ideas of socialist revolution and war against religion.

It became more and more important to institutionalize the political support of the regime and provide it with a set of guiding principles. The ideas behind new *Estado Nacional* had already been circulating among the intellectual leaders of the right. However, it is difficult to argue that there was a coherent set of ideas structuring the political ideology of the insurgents camp. José Luis Orella pointed out two important sources of inspiration for the establishment of the new regime. The first was Spanish traditionalism from the mid-nineteenth century. Based on the few principles (the existence of God, the dependence of the creation –the world on the Creator, the natural law as the basis for social relations)⁵⁰, the representatives of this current tried to reconcile the traditional, Catholic view on society, with the exigences of the modern political and economic life. Hence the success of the Pius XI encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* which inspired a series of debates on a Christian corporate state⁵¹.

This religious right had two dominant faces: the first one was conservative and openly monarchical. It was internally divided into supporters of Alphonse XIII gathered pre-war in the *Renovacion Española* and the carlist movement forming *Comunión Tradicionalista*. While not agreeing on the candidate to the throne, both groups agreed on the vision of future Spanish society and politics, which envisaged the reestablishment of the Kingdom of Spain. The most elaborate exposition of their world view was Victor Pradera's *El estado nuevo* which combined the elements of the Thomistic view of the man and society with a detailed description of how to organize state's institution to reflect and respect the divine order, which was an interesting attempt to synthetise and modernise Spanish traditionalism⁵².

The second group were those Catholics who accepted the republic (even if they preferred monarchy as an ideal) and tried to play by its rules –who

48 Stanely G. PAYNE, *The Franco Regime 1936-1975*, London: Phoenix Press, 2000, p. 108-109.

49 Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generała Franco*, Kraków: Arcana, 2004, p. 29-30.

50 José Luis ORELLA, *La formación del Estado nacional durante la Guerra Civil Española*, Madrid: Actas 2001, p. 13

51 *Ibidem*, p. 34.

52 *Ibidem*, p. 26; Víctor PRADERA, *El estado nuevo*, Burgos, 2ª edición, 1937.

identified firstly with the *Acción Popular* and subsequently with CEDA. This political family had a history of trying to reconcile the participation in parliamentary democracy, separation of Church and state as well as religious liberty with Catholic social teaching. They believed that by participating in second republic's government they will be able to shield the faithful from the radical secularists. The fear of a communist-inspired revolution and a disdain for liberal "disorder" pushed *cedistas* towards embracing a non-democratic solution. In the 1920s they accepted Primo de Rivera's dictatorship and once the war broke out in 1936 many joined the insurgents' ranks⁵³.

To complement this short review of political tendencies within Spanish right one cannot omit the Falange. Contrary to the above mentioned political groups, the movement led by the young Primo de Rivera had different nature. It was revolutionary and aimed at radically reforming Spanish society and politics, instead of re-establishing the everlasting norms of natural law. The antidemocratic, antiliberal rhetoric did led Falange leaders to embrace traditional values, on the contrary, they look to the revolutionary movements and upheavals across Europe, hoping to lead Spanish national revolution. The dual character of the Falange, merged with the *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sidicalista*, made the movement stretch between the poetic fascism of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera and more philosophically inclined Onesimo Redondo and Ramiro Ledesma, who intended to translate the German and Italian radical experiences into Spanish context⁵⁴.

To sum it all up, at the outbreak of the war forces that rallied around general Franco had a well-defined worldviews and a history of political engagement. None could effectively present itself as a new force, destined to seize power. An exception can be made for the Falange, which in a short period after the elections in 1936 experience a radical increase of members. Nonetheless, one should note that the leadership of the main political forces by the end of the 1936 had been gone. Therefore, there was an opportunity for the military leadership to impose a new synthesis on existing political forces and to reshape them according to the political needs of Franco. This new synthesis turned out to be an amalgam of conservative, religious and fascist ideas⁵⁵.

Between 1938 and 1942 Ramon Serano Suñer, the new energetic leader of the unified political movement (FET y de las JONS), and a close collaborator of Franco (and his brother-in-law) attempted a deep transformation the state.

53 Mary VINCENT, "Spain" in Tom BUCHANAN, Martin CONWAY (ed.), *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1965*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 97-128.

54 Stanley G. PAYNE, *Falange. A history of Spanish fascism...*, *op. cit.*

55 Javier TUSELL, *Spain: from Dictatorship to Democracy. 1939 to present*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, p. 12; Luis Aurelio GONZALES PRIETO, "El debate sobre la constitución en el primer franquismo (1939-1945)", *Revista de Estudios Políticos (nueva época)*, 155 (2012), p. 211.

He wanted Spain to modernise itself, yet rooted in its traditions. At the same time, he deeply influenced by German and Italian examples and seeing Spain's future as a part of the Axis. This does not mean that he was a follower of Nazi ideology. Rather, he saw in Germany and Italy an example of modernization that went against the liberal inefficiencies of the first half of the XX century⁵⁶. Suñer was sent by Franco to subdue Falange to general's will. In this sense he opposed a radical current, oriented at completing the transition of Spain to fully fledged fascist or Nazi regime. *Cuñado* trying to balance between the old-shirts and the *caudillo* proposed in 1941 to create a monocolour, falangist government. Franco dismantled the alliance between Falangist old guard and Suñer's pro-fascist entourage in May 1941. This was the first step towards the marginalization of FET leader, which was completed in his dismissal in 1942.

This year marks also an important change in Spain foreign policy. After the end of the civil war Spain did not want to engage in the new conflict. When the second world war broke out on 1 September 1939, Franco expressed his frustration with the attack on Catholic Poland, yet he stressed the communist, not Nazi aggression. Between 1941 and 1942 there was a lot of pressure from the German side, supported by radical falangists from the inside to complete Spain transition to the Axis side. Franco remained unconvinced, and limited Spain's engagement to a volunteer division fighting in the eastern front, while keeping channels of communication with the Allies, especially with the US and UK⁵⁷.

The defeat of *Wehrmacht* in the east and the allied advances in Africa, and then Italy solidified Spain neutral position. This also marked the gradual withering of fascist ideological predominance. The balance between revolutionary radicals and conservative nationalist tipped this time in favour of the latter group. The moved towards international neutrality and the failure of the attempt to complete the transition to fascism re-opened the question of the nature Franco leadership (was it of transitional, dictatorial –in the ancient terms– with an aim to re-establish monarchy, or permanent, following modern, antidemocratic examples) and the type of the regime he would create in Spain. These questions drove the exchanges between general Franco and Don Juan de Borbón, son of the king Alphonse XIII, who became the pretendent to the throne after his father abdication in 1941.

Don Juan supported the rebellion earning Franco's respect. However, *caudillo* did not want the king to return to Spain and expected, at least in 1942,

⁵⁶ Stanley G. PAYNE, *Falange. A history of Spanish fascism...*, *op. cit.*, p. 160, 197-198, 206; Javier TUSELL, *Spain: from Dictatorship to Democracy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 35-40; Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generala Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 87-92.

⁵⁷ Wayne H. BOWEN, *Spain during World War II*, Columbia MO: Univeristy of Missouri Press, 2006, p. 40-62.

Don Juan to publicly support Falangist program. The aspiring monarch looked at the movement with suspicion, preferring the traditional pillars of the monarchy: the military and conservatively organized society. Franco saw in the FET y de las JONS a guarantee of his influence. The tensions between the king and the general were further exacerbated by the fact that some of Don Juan's collaborators were in open opposition to Franco and contested his rule. This led to a stalemate, for instance, Gil Robles believed, that the king could return only in case of the collapse of Franco's regime⁵⁸. The possibility of the re-establishment of the monarchy had also an international dimension, some feared, that the victorious Allied powers would treat Spain as de-facto ally of Germany, which could lead to the re-establishment of the republic with all its chaos risk of communist infiltration.

This line of reasoning allowed the emergence of the idea to replace "compromised" dictatorship with a conservative monarchy, ensuring the social order. Between 1943 and 1944 Franco experienced the strongest challenge to his regime with a number of deputies to the Cortes and high-ranked officers pressured for his resignation and the return of the king⁵⁹. The general managed to defuse the tension, however his relations with Don Juan suffered heavily. In the years that followed the end of the second world war, Franco was isolated internationally and needed to ensure his power. This led to opening a new phase in the history of the regime marked by the abandonment of the concepts of dictatorship, social revolution and totalitarian state and the return to a traditional, conservative and Catholic ideas of social harmony, organic representation and paternalistic government. The sign of this change was the adoption on 13 July 1945 of the *Fuero de los Españoles*.

To conclude, the first phase of Franco's dictatorship was dedicated to the establishment of the new state. The decision to reject the second republic and its constitutional framework meant that a new legal and social structure had to be proposed. Initially, it seemed that Spain will follow the Italian and German path and will adopt a fully-fledged fascist system with a charismatic leader, a single political movement and deep control over the economy. However, this system was not completed, strong institutions, such as military, the Catholic Church, political plurality among the forces of the right, albeit without representation outside the FET y de las JONS, constituted a hurdle in completing Spain's transition into a fascist dictatorship. Since 1942 the national-conservative wing started to dominate over the Falangists, as a consequence, state's institutions started to embody the national-conservative ideas of organic de-

58 Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generala Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 122; Javier TUSELL, *Spain from dictatorship to democracy...*, *op. cit.*, p. 53-56.

59 Stanley G. PAYNE, *The Franco regime...*, *op. cit.*, p. 326-332; Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generala Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 137-142.

mocracy, restoring Spain's former greatness and reaffirm it on its path to realize its historic mission.

BUILDING NEW SPAIN –CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS OF THE EARLY FRANCO REGIME

One of the key decisions took by the insurgents in the latter course of the civil war was to break any kind of legal continuity with the second republic. In this way, what started as a possible coup aimed at replacing one ruling class with another, turned into a radical attempt to establish a new kind of Spanish statehood⁶⁰. This action was described by resorting to two names: that of regeneration –following the traditional language of national right, and that of a national-revolution, following the ideas of the younger Primo de Rivera. As it has been mentioned the tension between two paradigms present in the Franco's power elites underscored the state-building process throughout the initial phase of the regime lasting until 1945. For the purpose of comparison between Polish national-Catholic moment and the solidification of Spanish regime, it is useful to examine the most important legal acts that enter into force between 1936 and 1945. This would allow to identify ideological underpinning of the regime and the tensions between falangist and national-catholic ideologies as well as to point out three important ideas driving the regime-building: the idea of *unidad*, *caudillaje* and the particular idea of Hispanic messianism: the concept of *Hispanidad*.

The first step towards emergence of this new rightist ideology was the establishment of the single political movement which could contain all forces that supported *Alzamiento*⁶¹. The reasons standing behind the proclamation of FET y de las JONS on the 20 April 1937⁶² were pragmatic, however, they had important ideological consequences. The new movements repeated the declaration of the Falange of Primo de Rivera from 1933. The declaration opened with an indication of Spain as “supreme reality” which conservation and growth is the task of all the nation⁶³. The following points praised the might of the Spanish army and declared the imperial ambitions of the country. Subsequently, the document described the desired social order based on the family, the harmony of the classes within the state and the suppression of political

⁶⁰ Luis Aurelio GONZALES PRIETO, “El debate sobre la constitución en el primer franquismo...”, *op. cit.*, p. 211; Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generala Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 74-75.

⁶¹ George HILLS, *Monarquía, República y Franquismo 1868-1974*, Madrid: San Martin, 1975, p. 134-135.

⁶² Decreto número 44, BOE nº 182 20.04.1937, p. 1033-1034.

⁶³ I consulted the version published in: *Estado nacionalsindicalista. Puntos iniciales*, “Diario Español” 19.01.1939.

parties (FET y de las JONS was presented as a movement, not a party). In the field of economy new Falange advocated land reform and modernization of the agriculture sector. The last points (23 to 25) were dedicated to the role of education, which should be free and accessible, as well as religion, incorporating the “Catholic sentiment” into national reconstruction, while the final point constituted a call to national revolution to realize the outlined program.

What Franco achieved was to give a Falange’s language a more conservative reading and forcing in this way a synthesis of various currents of the pre-civil war right⁶⁴. As a result, the unification decree from 20 April did not adopt the Falange’s ideology for the state, but rather made use of the Falange program in order to strengthen the *Estado Nuevo*. Firstly, by strengthening his personal new leadership, secondly by using FET y de las JONS as an instrument of *Caudillo* of organizing and sustain support.

These functions were enshrined in the statute of the FET y de las JONS, which defined the organization a “militant movement” and “basis of the state” allowing Spain to realize its imperial destiny but also to establish economy servant to the State, social justice and Christian liberty. The founding values of the movement were defined as: service, fraternity and hierarchy⁶⁵. The fascist inspiration behind FET y de las JONS statute can be observed i.a. in describing trade unions as a part of the movement –apart from militias, the syndicate was the only social organization which was made part of the movement (art. 29-30).

Finally, it is worthwhile to examine the attempt to institutionalize charisma around *caudillo*. The leader of the movement, according to art. 47 of the statute “personifies all the values and honours of the movement” since he made possible the “Historic Era” which allowed Spain to acquire potential to realize its destiny. He receives “in its fulness” the highest authority. *El Jefe* is responsible “before God and History” which brings about the similarity between the statute and Polish constitution from 1935 where the President was “responsible before God and History for the fate of the State”⁶⁶.

Contrarily to the unification decree, which balanced fascist and conservative-Catholic values, the statutes seem to drive the regime towards a fascist dictatorship, which could be explained by the personal involvement of Serrano Suñer in their writing. The idea to elevate the movement and to stress the position of the leader vis-à-vis the institutions recalls the fascist concepts of national-revolution aimed at strengthening the movement at the expense of

64 Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generała Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

65 Estatutos de FET y de las JONS, BOE n° 291 7.08.1937, p. 2738-2742, quote from art. 1.

66 Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 23 kwietnia 1935 r., Dz.U. 1935 nr 30 poz. 227, quote from art. 2 (2); in the FET statute the wording was introduced by one of Franco’s monarchist collaborators, Eugenio Mones: see Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generała Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

the state⁶⁷. It can be said, that while the majority of funding values of the *Estado Nacional* came from the national-catholic universe, the statutes suggested that from the institutional perspective Spain was to become a dictatorial, fascist regime.

Another example of a hybrid character of Franco regime's ideology was the *Fuero del trabajo* proclaimed on 9 March 1938. The initial idea to call the act *Carta del trabajo* to give it more semblance with the Italian *Carta del lavoro* of 1927 was abandoned to use a medieval term "fuero" meaning a charter to protect rights. Furthermore, a study of two documents shows that although similar there is an important difference between the fascist and francoist legal act. The former opened with the description of State's tasks with regard to the organized labour and saw the syndicate as a tool of the state employed to organize production⁶⁸, whereas the latter before establishing state's control over economy recalls traditional Catholic teaching of the dignity and autonomy of the labour⁶⁹. The declarations which indicate the rights of the worker as well as mentions of the social guarantees such as family wage show that besides *Carta del Lavoro*, the Spanish act had been inspired by the Catholic social teaching, i.a. by the *Quadragesimo anno encyclical*⁷⁰.

The legal act that signalled a change of accents in the regime was the adoption on 17 July 1942 of the *Ley de los Cortes*⁷¹. Despite the fact, that the establishment of the *Cortes* coincided with the fall of Suñer, it did not contradict in principle the ambition to create a fascist regime, given the limited competences of the chamber (art 11-13). More important, however, was the symbolic weight of the establishment of *Cortes*. The preamble of the act indicated the goal of "perfecting the positive law of the revolution", showing the presence of the fascist paradigm. However, the preamble also stated that "through its name, composition and competences" *Cortes* were to "follow the glorious Spanish traditions"⁷². The continuity with the tradition was also marked by the restoration of the medieval name *procuradores* – a similar move as in the case of *Fuero de trabajo*, which will be culminated in the issuing of the *Fuero de los españoles* in 1945.

The *Cortes* were not designed to introduce a democratic element to the regime. They were not representative in terms of the liberal-democratic meaning

67 See interesting observations on Engelbert Dolfuss in Austria and Leon Degrelle in Belgium in José Luis ORELLA, *La formación del Estado nacional...*, *op. cit.*, p. 30-38.

68 *Carta del lavoro*, *Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia*, n° 100 30.04.1927, p. 1794-1797.

69 *Fuero del trabajo*, BOE n° 505 10.03.1938, p. 6178-6181.

70 Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generata Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 60; Stanley G. PAYNE, *Franco regime...*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

71 *Ley de las Cortes*, BOE n° 200 19.07.1942, p. 5301-5303.

72 See Miguel Ángel GIMENÉZ MARTÍNEZ, "Las primeras Cortes del Franquismo, 1942-1967: una dócil cámara para la dictadura", *Vínculos de Historia*, 1 (2012), p. 248.

of the term. Neither could they directly influence the decision-making process. Instead they “were the supreme organ of the participation of the Spanish people in the works of the State. Their mission was to prepare and elaborate law without prejudice to the competences pertaining to the Head of the State” (art. 1). Therefore, through *Cortes* the people participated in the creation of the new legal order. This participation was mediated by professional and regional groups, making the parliament a corporative body. In fact, the *Cortes* were embodying a traditional concept of an “organic democracy”⁷³. Paweł Skibiński acutely noted that the law of 1942 was a top-down attempt to recreate organic society through the institutions of the state⁷⁴.

With regard to the three driving ideas of the regime, the idea of unity is one of the most often recalled characteristics of the *Estado Nuevo*. Its meaning extended well beyond the conception of a modern unitary state, which excluded territorial autonomies. There had to be one political organization, a single trade union, a state ideology that encompassed all manifestations of modern political life. On the other hand, this unity had to be organic, that is, a harmonious balance among what was recognized as natural divisions (of trade, of origin). Finally, the unity, as expressed in 26 points of the Falange, had transcendent nature, pointing towards the universal. This provided the regime with a teleology that was not autoreferential and thus constituting an obstacle for the regime to assume totalitarian character⁷⁵.

Turning to the second of above-indicated principles: the idea of *caudillaje*, one can see it as a move away from the stalemate of monarchy-republic dilemma. The nature of the power wielded by *Caudillo* was extraordinary. It represented the unity of the New State and was the linchpin of all the system. Recent studies of the idea of *caudillaje* show its double nature: on one hand the term suggests a political-military leader of the Latin-American type, that is a soldier establishing a political community. Franco is often referred to as an exemplary model of Weberian charismatic power with additional emphasis put on the religious sanction (*Caudillo por la Gracia de Dios*) which played an important role in the regime’s legitimacy (civil war as an anti-communist crusade). On the other hand, scholars stress the Schmittian contribution to the meaning of the term, emphasising the German influence in establishing *Caudillaje* as

73 See Víctor PRADERA, *El estado nuevo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 97-101, who praised the superiority of the organic *Cortes* over democratic parliament torn by quarrels and the thirst for power and influence.

74 Paweł SKIBIŃSKI, *Państwo generata Franco...*, *op. cit.*, p. 127, 129.

75 See Hannah ARENDT, *The origins of totalitarianism*, San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979, ch. 13, where the author provides an extensive arguments against treating totalitarianism as another form of government and shows that totalitarian systems are autoreferential in terms of their values while all historic forms of government worked on the basis of certain “legal” basis that they were expected to protect and realize.

an element of the doctrine of the state⁷⁶. In these terms Caudillo is a modern dictator able to nullify the pre-existing status quo and to create a new order by the virtue of his decision⁷⁷. The popular sanction was provided by an “armed plebiscite” and Franco as a victorious leader could lead his people into a new future⁷⁸.

The third element of the francoist ideology was the adoption of the idea of *Hispanidad*. The notion itself was, as many elements of the regime ideology, inherited from the pre-civil war national-right’s imaginary. David Marcilhacy stressed the double function of this idea within francoist context. Firstly, it served to reorient foreign policy indicating a direction of action and potential partners. Secondly, it provided post-civil-war Spain with a rich repertoire of symbols and references crucial for the establishment of a state’s ideology⁷⁹. The author of the most coherent articulation of the idea of *Hispanidad* was Ramiro de Maetzu. In his seminal work he outlined the historical ideal of the Spanish state –the colonial empire of XVI century– using it as a matrix for the restoration of Spain degraded by nineteenth century liberalism⁸⁰.

Only by returning to its golden age Spain could find its mission and play its part as a civilization. Moreover, the idea of a Spanish historic mission coincided with Franco’s anticommunism. The restoration of the Spain’s internal order through the rejection of Marxist influence enabled Spain to spread the anticommunism across the globe and realize its civilizing and Christianising mission⁸¹.

To conclude, throughout the period from 1937 to 1945 there was a tension between what could be called a fascist and a conservative reading of the regime’s ideology. The founding legal acts as well as the principles governing the ideas behind the regime building process could be easily interpreted as a fascist, however, every time their conservative, Catholic reading was valid

76 Adam WIELOMSKI, “Carl Schmitt w Hiszpanii frankistowskiej na tle komparatystycznym” in Jacek BARTYZEL, Roman BÄCKER, Joanna RAK (ed.) *Hiszpania Franco. System polityczny, nurty ideowe i konteksty frankizmu*, Radzymin: von Borowiecky 2020, p. 201-252.

77 Enrique MORADIELLOS, “Franco, el Caudillo. Origen y perfil de una magistratura política carismática”, *Historia y política*, 35 (2016), p. 261-287; Ismael SAZ, “Franco, ¿Caudillo Fascista? Sobre las sucesivas y contradictorias concepciones falangistas del caudillaje franquista”, *Historia y Política*, 27 (2012), p. 27-50.

78 Luis Aurelio GONZALES PRIETO, “El debate sobre la constitución en el primer franquismo...”, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

79 David MARCIHACY, “La Hispanidad bajo el franquismo. El americanismo al servicio de un proyecto nacionalista” in Stéphane MICHONNEAU, Xosé M. NÚÑEZ-SEIXAS (ed.), *Imaginario y representaciones de España durante el Franquismo*, Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2014, reproducido en línea en: <https://books.openedition.org/cvz/1161> [22 July 2022].

80 Ramiro DE MAETZU, *Defensa de la Hispanidad*, Madrid: Gráfica Universal, 1934.

81 E. RAMÓN ARRANGO, *The Spanish Political System: Franco’s Legacy*, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1984, p. 111-113.

and justified. The rejection of the fascist programme was a political decision, however, there were strong religious and cultural arguments against the full implementation of Hitler and Mussolini's order. In addition, Franco's decision not to resign by the end of the war, a move in favour of the restoration of the monarchy, opened a new chapter in the ideological history of the regime which achieved its mature phase.

CHRISTIAN MESSIANIC NATIONALISM —A DEAD-END CURRENT OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL CATHOLICISM

Moving to the final part of this paper, one can already anticipate the results of a comparison between the state-building project of the Polish underground 'Unia' and the constitutional ideas of the early Franco regime. Certainly, the differences outnumber the similarities. The geopolitical position of Spain and Poland during the second world war was radically different. This dictated different views on the role of Nazi Germany. Secondly, Poles were much eager to support the Allies, which in turn were a threat to Spain's economic sovereignty. Ideologically-wise Poles rejected those conservative-national projects that allied with Hitler, while they constituted a source of inspiration for some Spanish intellectuals.

An important difference was that contrarily to Spain, Polish Catholics did not elaborate a doctrine of a charismatic leadership. Except for Piłsudski who bore the title of *Naczelnik* (Chief of State), no other personage in the Polish interwar politics attained such position to be considered above the legal order of the state. Interestingly, also at the level of political thought, on the Catholic side of the Polish political scene there was little consideration for a dictatorial solution to the inefficiencies of the political life. This may suggest that in case of dictatorships a doctrine comes after the dictator seizes the power.

However, there are similarities that make the comparison worthwhile and allow to point out a moment in the intellectual history of political Catholicism which was completely lost by the end of the second world war. First, it can be noted that both analysed cases highlighted their nationalism. At the same time this nationalism did not reject Catholicism but claimed that by merging religious and national identity the latter became "refined", fundamentally different from racial ideas of Hitler, and to a lesser degree Mussolini.

Second, the national state, which according to both sides should express the national genius was not the ultimate goal, but a mean to the end of fulfilling national historic destiny, which was at the same time geopolitical and cultural. In the case of 'Unia' it was a restoration of a federal state in Central Europe, while for Spanish national state it was the renewal of ties with Hispanic world on the other side of Atlantic. According to thinkers like Jerzy Braun in Poland

and Ramiro de Maetzu in Spain modernity did not serve well their polities, as a result they advised a revival of ideas and imaginaries from early modern period which should serve as an inspiration for Poland and Spain to regain their place in Europe.

Moreover, both authors stressed the messianic character of their nations' histories. The reestablishment of Poland and Spain as regional powers, and their liberation from foreign cultures and influences should serve as a way for these states to draw all other European nations behind towards a new kind of international order.

Third, despite placing the ideal of the polity in the past, the means through which the restoration of national greatness could be achieved were modern. Catholics in Poland and in Spain wanted a deep corporatist reform in line with the papal teaching of that time. For a country with a sizable agricultural sector, an industrial reform was complemented with a land reform aim at strengthening individual farmers and middle-size farms. In its 1941-1942 programme Polish 'Unia' declared a need for a deep reform of the economy, state driven industrialization and obligatory unionization of the labour. In parallel, Spain introduced state-organized syndicate, envisaged professional representation in the *Cortes* and also wanted to exercise a political control over the direction of the economy. What is particularly important in noticing this parallel in economic thinking is that in other European countries the 1940s were the moment of abandonment of the corporatist approach, a beginning of a search for what afterwards will be called "social market economy"⁸².

CONCLUSIONS

In lieu of conclusion, it should be noted that the elements listed above do not constitute a fully-fledged political ideology. What they indicate is that equally as we think about a trans-national history of fascism, in which Spain plays an important role, it was equally important for the trans-national history of political Catholicism. The similarities between the ideas elaborated by 'Unia' in 1942 with what became a political reality in Spain shows that on the opposite side of Europe, one could reach similar conclusions regarding what should be the preferred political order.

It is also important to address the nature of the change in political ideology after 1942. In Poland it meant that former national Catholics embraced democratic ideals and espoused a philosophy close to Christian democrats from Italy and France. In Spain, Franco's decision not to give in the pressures to

⁸² See in this regard the analysis of Maurizio CAU, "La via maestra alla giustizia sociale. Alcide De Gasperi tra solidarismo e corporativismo", *Scienza e Politica*, vol. 21 n° 41 (2009), p. 20-31.

resign consolidated the regime and allowed the national-catholic experience to continue.

Ismael Saz indicated two distinct political cultures within Franco's regime, arguing that the Falangist ultranationalism ultimately lost with national Catholicism, but both currents contributed to the birth of national political culture⁸³. I believe that for a study of Catholic political traditions that throughout the XX century did not reject their nationalistic element (and this is the case of 'Union' and some of its descendants), Franco's regime is an important point of reference, even though marginalized in the second half of the century.

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